The Senses Considered As Perceptual Systems Gibson Pdf Editor
Knowledge in perception and illusion. Temporal synchrony has been considered the. The senses considered as. The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems James Gibson. 3.3 out of 5 stars 8. Contact the editor about this article; Authors. Share; Full article on Wiley Online Library: HTML PDF. - 'The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems' Book Review T. Perception in Philosophy of Mind (categorize this paper) Options Edit this record. Mark as duplicate. Export citation. Find it on Scholar. Request removal from index. Misperception and Perceptual Systems: J. Gibson and the Problem of Illusion.
J. J. Gibson (1966) The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
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The very idea of a retinal pattern-sensation that can be impressed onthe neural tissue of the brain is a misconception, for the neuralpattern never even existed in the retinal mosaic. There can be noanatomical engram in the brain if there was no anatomical image in theretina. The retina jerks about. It has a rapid tremor. It even hasa gap in it (the blind spot). It is a scintillation, not an image.An engram impressed on the brain would have to be divided into twochanging parts in the two halves of the brain, which is impossible.The whole idea stems from the persistent myth that there has to besomething in the brain that is visible, and from Johannes Mueller'sassumption that the nerves telegraph messages to the brain.
The reason the surface area corresponding to the blind spot can lookblack or white or colored or striped or checkered or slanted is thatit cannot appear to be a hole or gap in the surface. To seea hole or gap requires stimulus information, and that is just what theblind spot cannot pick up. 'Filling in' is a misnomer, therefore,since there never was a phenomenal hole in the world to be filled in.
Edward S. Reed (1988) James J. Gibson and the Psychology ofPerception. Yale University Press, New Haven.
For centuries philosophers and scientists alike have taught that weare directly aware not of the things surrounding us, but only of oursubjective representations. ... Gibson's theory of direct perceptionchallenged this scientific dogma by showing that perception is notpurely a subjective matter.
University Of Liverpool
Gibson denied that perception was based on sensory inputs or stimuliat all. Instead, he claimed that perception was based on ecologicalinformation, which is external to organisms, and, unlike sensoryinputs, specific to its environmental sources.
Journal Of The British Society For Phenomenology
Sutherland (1985) about direct perception: 'So silly that it is notworth taking seriously'.